What are the effects of war on political behavior? Colombia is an interesting case in which conflict and elections coexist, and illegal armed groups intentionally affect electoral outcomes. Nonetheless, groups use different strategies to alter these results. This paper argues that differential effects of violence on electoral outcomes are the result of deliberate strategies followed by illegal groups, which in turn, are a consequence of military conditions that differ between them. Using panel data from Senate elections from 1994 to 2006 and an instrumental variable approach to address potential endogeneity concerns, this paper shows that guerrilla violence decreases turnout, while paramilitary violence has no effect on participation, but reduces electoral competition and benefits non-traditional third parties.
armed groups to support particular candidates instead of boycotting the elections.
Within this theoretical framework, what are the effects of civil conflict on voting behavior?
In order to address potential endogeneity concerns in the relationship between violence and political outcome, an instrumental variable approach is followed in this paper, analyzing Senate elections from 1994 to 2006 in Colombia. This paper exploits the fact that, after 1998, FARC attacks were more common around the region in which a failed peace process took place. Additionally, in the case of paramilitary violence, this paper exploits the fact that these groups had special interests on lands suitable for the cultivation of oil palm trees.
My estimations reveal that an additional unit in the rate of FARC attacks (per 100,000 habitants) decreases voter turnout by almost 4%, while paramilitary violence has no significant effect. These results are robust to different measures of violence. In addition, it is realized that, after 1998, electoral competition, measured by the vote share of the winning candidate, is lower in municipalities attacked by paramilitaries. Also, after 1998, traditional parties have exhibited a decrease in their senate vote shares, while third parties (small, newly created, nontraditional parties) have increased their shares. This suggests that politicians that established alliances with paramilitaries utilized these new parties as the main channels for acquiring votes. Supplementing this, FARC violence is significantly higher during election years, while paramilitary violence is lower. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the guerrilla's strategy is to sabotage the elections, while the paramilitaries establish alliances with certain candidates.
Overall, these results have important implications in the actual context of Colombia's conflict. First, if some of the successors of paramilitary groups, in the form of criminal gangs, still control entire territories of the country, it would no be surprising if they employ illicit strategies in order to coerce people to vote against FARC and government agreements. Second, demobilization of FARC and their commitment to the peace process should reflect increased turnout in the regions where they exerted some influence, starting with the plebiscite. This paper is hereby divided into 6 sections, including this introduction. The relation of the paper to the existing literature is discussed in section two. In the third section, background on Colombia's civil conflict is presented. This section also discusses the empirical strategy proposed to understand the causal effects of civil conflict on voter behavior. Section four then describes the data analyzed throughout the paper and provides relevant descriptive statistics. Finally, in section five the main results are presented, demonstrating that FARC attacks decrease turnout, while paramilitary attacks have no impact on turnout, yet have a differential impact on electoral competition and parties' vote shares after 1998. This section also provides evidence in favor of the proposed mechanism. The paper concludes with the discussion in section six.
Literature
The broad connection between elections and violence has intrigued several authors and inspired interesting studies (Snyder (2000) , Varshney (2002) , Brass (2003) , Dunning (2011) , Bekoe (2012) or Hefner-Burton and Jablonski (2014) ). This paper represents a contribution to at least four groups of studies that analyze this relationship. First, it is related to the literature pertaining to the political and electoral legacies of civil war. Authors like Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Blattman (2009) analyze the causal effects of civil conflict on political behavior, both with optimistic results. Analyzing the Sierra Leone civil war, Bellows and Miguel find that voter registration in postwar elections is higher in areas that experienced increased levels of violence. Blattman finds that forced recruitment leads to an increase in the likelihood of voting. The results presented in this paper are less optimistic, as people have lower levels of political participation in FARC territories.
The paper also speaks to the literature on the effects of terrorism on electoral outcomes.
Montalvo (2010), for instance, using al Qaeda's terrorist attacks in Madrid, shows how these events have the capacity to affect how people vote. Within the context of the Israeli-Palestine conflict, authors like Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) and Berrebi and Klor (2008) , show that terrorism causes an increase in the relative support for right-wing parties. In a similar vein, Kibris (2011) shows that PKK attacks in Turkey make voters punish the incumbent and support less concessionist parties. In this paper a strong connection between paramilitary attacks and support for right-wing parties is also found, but for different reasons that will be discussed below.
The third group of studies closely related to this paper corresponds to the literature on the strategic use of violence to obtain votes. Wilkinson (2006) offers an interesting account of the relationship between conflict and democracy, showing how ethnic riots are employed as instruments for encouraging people to vote. Norton (2007) shows how Hezbollah has influenced Lebanese domestic politics, which demonstrates that this group's mix of violence and politics has been electorally successful. In the context of Nigeria's 2007 presidential election, Collier and Vicente (2014) find that intimidation and violence, mainly used by weak parties and challengers, are effective in reducing voter turnout. These results are consistent with the finding of this paper that attacks affect variables such as turnout and competition, and that violence has been used strategically to alter elections.
Finally, this paper has a strong connection to the burgeoning literature on the political economy of paramilitaries and insurgencies in Colombia. Several studies have shown how these groups established alliances with certain candidates and forced voters to support them (see for example Acemoglu et al. (2013) , Hoskin and Garcia (2003) , Garcia (2008 ) Romero (2007 , Lopez (2007 ), or Lopez (2010 ). Dube and Naidu (2015) study the connection between U.S. aid, paramilitary violence and electoral outcomes. Steele (2011) claims that displacement perpetrated by paramilitaries in the city of Apartado was strategic and ideologically oriented.
Even though these studies provide insight on the connection between violence and elections in Colombia, guerrilla strategies are usually absent in these accounts, being Weintraub et al.
(2015) a notable exception.
Empirical Strategy
To uncover the effect of conflict on voting behavior, this paper analyzes Colombian Senate elections 1 at the municipality level, for election-years 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 . Given that these elections take place in March and that, in contrast, yearly measures of violence are used, the main specifications use lagged variables. Thus, for example, it is better to use the 1997 rate of FARC attacks to describe what happened in 1998, because otherwise post-electoral measures would be used. This way, it is also possible to mitigate, to some extent, potential endogeneity existing between political outcomes and violence. 2
The basic specification estimated in this paper calculates, through a linear regression, the effect of FARC, paramilitary, and State attacks on voter turnout, controlling for municipality and election-year fixed effects, and time-varying municipality level controls. Year effects control for municipality-invariant characteristics that are common for a given year and that might be correlated with civil conflict. For instance, if the cancelation of the Caguan peace process in 2001 had a national-level impact on turnout common to all municipalities, this effect will be captured by the year dummies. Municipality fixed effects control for time-invariant characteristics of each municipality, such as climatic and geographic conditions, which tend to be correlated with war. Therefore, we estimate:
where the dependent variable turnout it is the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in municipality i during election year t; ψ i are municipality fixed effects; γ t are election-year fixed effects; X it is a vector of time-varying municipality level controls, which include State attacks, as well as time-invariant measures of the natural log of population, population density, coca cultivation, and education, 3 interacted with year dummies. 4 Finally, the main independent variables are F arc it−1 and P aras it−1 , which in the basic models represent the rate of FARC and paramilitary attacks per 100,000 habitants, in municipality i the year before the election at t. In other specifications, whose reports are reported on the online appendix and in order to test the robustness of the results, these variables will be the average rate of attacks for the three years that precede each election, or a dummy variable indicating if a municipality had any form of attack the year before the election.
From (1), it is clear that the coefficients β 1 and β 2 capture the relationship between voter turnout and FARC and paramilitary attacks, respectively. According to the mechanism proposed in this paper, we expect β 1 < 0, so that municipalities with higher rates of FARC attacks tend to have lower levels of participation. An instrumental variables strategy is used to address this potential endogeneity problem.
Given that there are two potentially endogenous regressors, FARC and paramilitary attacks, at least two excluded instruments are needed. Each instrument must be correlated with the respective endogenous regressor, but uncorrelated with the error term. Additionally, given the fixed effects specification followed throughout the paper, time-varying instruments are needed. In the case of the rate of FARC attacks, distance to Caguan will be used in interaction with a post 1998 dummy variable. The discussion given in the previous section justifies this instrument. The post 1998 dummy equals one for election-years 2002 and 2006, after the Caguan peace process was aborted and Plan Colombia was launched. Therefore, and as a consequence of the strengthening of the State forces, during these years FARC attempted to retain the control of municipalities close to Caguan. In this region, the guerrilla was able to develop a fully integrated chain of coca cultivation and cocaine production (Rico, 2010) .
Therefore, it is expected that, after 1998, as distance to Caguan increases, the rate of FARC attacks decreases, as well. Supplementing this, it is hard to think that this instrument might affect voter turnout through a different channel. Why would citizens further away from the demilitarized zone vote more (or less) after 1998, if it is not because of the incidence of FARC attacks?
In the case of paramilitary attacks, we exploit the fact that after the 1998 expansion, these groups became involved in the cultivation of oil palm trees, which grow under very specific geographic and climatic conditions. In particular, and according to Mingorance et al. (2004) , this tree grows in lands below 500 meters above the sea level, and with average temperatures within 22 and 32 degrees Celsius. Given these characteristics, a dummy variable is constructed, indicating if a municipality satisfies the conditions for cultivation of oil palm trees. This indicator variable is interacted with the post 1998 dummy, because it is expected that, in 2002 and 2006, years in which the paramilitaries had already consolidated their expansion and demobilized, attacks in these municipalities should have decreased. In particular, attacks in 1998 are expected to be much higher in these municipalities than later, because in this year the AUC were consolidating the control of these regions. Therefore, this study expects that after 1998, municipalities suitable for the cultivation of oil palm trees have a lower rate of paramilitary attacks, so that the instrument is correlated with the endogenous regressor.
Also, it is reasonable to believe that this interaction is uncorrelated with any other factor that might affect voter turnout, satisfying the exclusion restriction. In this context, the first stage equations estimated are given by:
where F arc it−1 and P aras it−1 once more represent the rate of attacks per 100,000 inhabitants of FARC and paramilitaries, respectively. Here, palm i is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the municipality's altitude is below 500 meters and if its average temperature is within the 22
and 32 degrees Celsius range; Also, ldistcaguan i is the natural log of the distance, 6 measured in kilometers, between municipality i and San Vicente del Caguan, the most representative municipality of the demilitarized zone.
The second stage is given by:
where F arc it−1 and P aras it−1 are the predicted values that result from the first stage. Finally, standard errors of all specifications are fully robust as they are clustered at the municipality level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation at this level.
Data
The main conflict-related data set used in this analysis comes from the Conflict Analysis
Resource Center (CERAC). Based on event-counting, this data set reports actions ( 
Results

FARC and Paramilitary attacks and Voter Turnout
In this section, the main results of the effects of civil conflict on voter turnout are presented. Table 1 presents OLS estimates of equation (1). In the complete inventory of specifications, municipality fixed effects and time effects (with year 1994 as the baseline) are included and standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Columns 1-4 show that the rate of FARC attacks has a negative and significant effect on voter turnout. Columns 1 and 2 do not include time-varying controls at the municipality level, although column 2 indicates that this result is robust to the inclusion of lagged rates of attacks (i.e. rates two years before each election). In columns 3 and 4, the interaction of year dummies with time-invariant measures of population, population density, coca cultivation and education is included. The same result holds: municipalities with a higher rate of attacks per 100,000 inhabitants tend to have a lower level of turnout.
The coefficient associated with column 1, the simplest specification, shows that a unit increase in the rate of attacks per 100,000 inhabitants reduces turnout by about 0.157 percentage points. Given that for municipalities with a non-zero rate of attacks the average rate is 7.01, turnout is about 1 percentage point lower for an average municipality attacked by FARC when compared to a municipality not attacked. Although these numbers might seem small, endogeneity might be reducing the real effects if FARC attacks municipalities in which a high turnout rate is expected.
In contrast, the coefficient associated with the rate of paramilitary attacks is insignificant in all the specifications. This result suggests that paramilitary violence has a different effect on turnout, consistent with the idea that the strategies employed by both illegal groups to alter electoral results differ. If it is accepted that paramilitaries make alliances with politicians and sponsor certain candidates, it might seem surprising that the effect is not significant and not positive. Nonetheless, this result is still consistent, because it is not necessary to increase turnout in order to make a candidate win. It might be sufficient to suppress opposers' turnout and to encourage supporters of the sponsored candidate. Naturally, if paramilitary intervention is not having an evident effect on turnout, it is desirable to determine if any other variable is being influenced by the violence of these groups. 7 Table A .3 in the Online Appendix shows that these results are robust to alternative measures of conflict. In alternative specifications conflict is measured using the average rates of attacks by each group during the three immediate years that precede an election, a dummy variable indicating if a municipality had one or more attacks in a given year, or a measure of clashes between legal and illegal groups. In any case the result is the same: places attacked by FARC exhibit lower levels of turnout, while paramilitary actions have no clear effect. For the rationale behing each measure, see the Online Appendix.
Causal Effect of Attacks on Turnout
As discussed above, reverse causality might lead to biased estimates of the effects of civil conflict on voter turnout. For instance, if FARC forms an (precise) expectation of which municipalities will have a high level of turnout, and attack those places in order to suppress voters, a form of reverse causality would generate a downward bias of the estimates reported in table 1. Such a strategy makes sense if one of the objectives of this group is to sabotage elections and challenge the status quo. Conversely, if their strategy is to attack municipalities with low levels of turnout, because in these places the state's presence is weak or nonexistent, therefore making it is easier to attack, then the estimates will have an upward bias. To address these potential endogeneity issues, an instrumental variable approach is used as discussed in the empirical strategy section. Table 2 reports the causal effects of FARC and paramilitary violence on voter turnout, using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations.
In column 1 of table 2, the second stage results (equation (2)) are reported. Once more, the rate of FARC attacks per 100,000 habitants has a negative and significant effect on voter turnout. Importantly, the magnitude of the estimated parameter is larger (in absolute value) than any of the coefficients reported in table 1. This finding suggests that without instrumenting the endogenous regressors, the OLS estimates are downwardly biased. Therefore, these results suggest that FARC attacks municipalities in which political participation is expected to be high, which is consistent with the idea that violence is used strategically to alter electoral outcomes or, simply, to sabotage the electoral process. In this case, the estimations suggest that a unit increase in the rate of attacks per 100,000 habitants reduces turnout by about 3.2 percentage points. This is certainly a non-negligible effect, given that if for municipalities with a non-zero rate of attacks the average rate is 7.01, turnout is about 22 percentage points lower for an average municipality attacked by FARC when compared to a municipality not attacked. The effect is robust and even higher after municipality time-varying covariates are controlled. In such a case, the estimated coefficient is about -3.7, suggesting that the predicted difference in turnout between a non-attacked municipality and one with the average rate among attacked municipalities is approximately 26 percentage points.
Column 1 in his anti-insurgency strategy against the guerrillas, violence close to and around the former demilitarized zone became more intense. This is not surprising given that during the peace process FARC increased its control over regions around Caguan, intensifying the production of illegal crops (coca) in these places. Therefore, after the peace process is over and given that the State army went after the insurgents in these regions, the increase in unilateral attacks reveals FARC's attempt to defend and preserve control over the area.
In addition, the interaction between the palm condition dummy and the post 1998 indicator variable has a negative and significant coefficient in both cases (with and without controls). This result suggests that, in 2001 and 2005, after the paramilitaries consolidated their expansion, the rate of unilateral attacks in municipalities suitable for the cultivation of palm tree was lower. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, if the paramilitaries gained control of these lands between 1997 and 2001, they were not interested in perpetrating attacks that could alter the exploitation of these lands. 8
Given that there are two endogenous regressors (FARC and paramilitary attacks), Angrist and Pischke's F statistic is a suitable test for weak identification (Angrist and Pischke (2009) ).
Statistics reported in the table reveal that using these criteria for the two instruments, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that the rates of FARC and paramilitary attacks are weakly identified. Consequently, the first stage results suggest that the excluded instruments are not weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors.
Electoral Competition and Parties' Vote Shares
If the paramilitaries have no effect on voter turnout, which variable is affected by their presence? Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2009) show that in regions affected by paramilitary violence, after these actors got involved in politics, the change in third (non-traditional) parties' vote share was higher than in regions without paramilitary presence. 9 Their argument is that para-politicians used this type of party, instead of traditional parties, in order to win elections. Here an alternative approach is employed. As it was previously argued, increasing turnout is not necessary for a candidate to win. But, if the paramilitaries are supporting certain candidates in their regions, after 1998, these places should exhibit different patterns in terms of electoral competition. The maximum vote share in each municipality is utilized as a measure of competition. 10 Table A .4 in the Online Appendix illustrates that all the results of the effects of paramilitary violence on parties' vote shares are robust to an alternative measure of conflict, a dummy variable indicating if municipality i had any form of (FARC or paramilitary) attack on a given year.
Overall, the results presented here support the idea that FARC's strategy is to suppress turnout, while the paramilitaries affect electoral outcomes (in favor of third parties and against traditional parties, especially the Liberal Party) and electoral competition (with higher maximum vote shares in paramilitary regions). Additionally, FARC violence is higher during an election year, while the paramilitaries are more violent on non-election years.
Testing the Mechanism
In this paper, it is stressed that military conditions of illegal groups exert some influence on the methods available to alter electoral results. In the case of guerrilla groups fighting an irregular (asymmetric) war (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010), guerrilla warfare implies taking advantage of mobility and terrain roughness. This situation is the case of FARC in Colombia, especially after 2002 when president Uribe launched his anti-insurgency campaign. In such a scenario, it is much harder for an irregular group to achieve control of the population, to establish strong ties and to cooperate with civilians, especially with rural elites. When control is achieved, it generally takes place in peripheral areas. Therefore, creating alliances with candidates, which implies medium and long run investments, becomes hard or unfeasible. In the case of paramilitaries, the situation is quite different. These groups emerged as a counter-insurgent reaction and were sponsored by ranchers, landowners, entrepreneurs, and narco-traffickers.
Hence, in the absence of a strong state, territorial stability in populated and non-peripheral regions was a key characteristic that allowed AUC to provide security to the sponsoring elites.
In such circumstances, control of the population is easier and fundamental, which includes coercing civilians to vote for the candidates of their alliances.
Consequently, the mechanism proposed in this paper has two components. First, the impact of violence on voting outcomes is the result of deliberate strategies followed by illegal armed groups to alter the elections. And second, these strategies respond to military and structural conditions that characterize the groups and their interaction with civilians. To support this mechanism, this paper proceeds in two stages. First, to support the idea that strategies are deliberate, each group's rate of attacks on electoral years versus non-electoral years is analyzed. Second, to show that military conditions matter, the fact that FARC's situation has changed over time is exploited. In particular, focus includes the finding that, after 2002, with the strengthening of the Colombian state, this guerrilla group lost control of many regions and had to rely more on typical guerrilla warfare. Finally, Table 7 shows that the effect of FARC violence on turnout varies over time as suggested by the proposed mechanism. Columns differ in terms of the conflict measured Naturally, the main challenge posed by these findings is explaining why different illegal armed groups use different strategies to alter electoral outcomes. Here, one possible explanation is proposed: the relation between illegal groups and the local dominant elites determines the behavior of these organizations. The dynamics of war support this explanation. Structural conditions that define Colombia's conflict might explain these patterns. Guerrilla groups, like FARC, tend to be mobile and generally do not stay in the same place for long periods of time. Consequently, it is hard for these groups to offer security to the (legal or illegal) economic elites that control a region. The paramilitaries, on the contrary, are more stable and use to stay in the same place for longer periods. Therefore, in the presence of a weak State, these groups are successful at offering private security to local elites. This argument would explain, in part, why the paramilitaries capture the State from inside, through alliances with politicians, while FARC is unable to make these alliances and prefers to sabotage the electoral process. This statement does not pretend to suggest that ideology plays no role. It is just the recognition that material conditions might determine how these violent organizations operate.
Even though the Colombian case is interesting and dramatic, studies like Wilkinson (2006) and Collier and Vicente (2014) reveal that in many other contexts there is a clear relation between conflict and political behavior. Why is it the case that different groups use different strategies to alter electoral results? Is it always the case that right-wing armed groups form alliances with incumbents and elites in order to perpetuate the status quo? Is it always the case that insurgent groups attack democratic institutions suppressing turnout? Naturally, for understanding the patterns found here, and in order to answer these questions and challenges, we need a general theory of how illegal armed groups affect electoral outcomes in a context of civil war. That should be the next step.
Notes
1 Senate elections are analyzed in this paper to show the magnitude of the problem, as illegal groups were able to shape the composition of national level entities like the Congress. When presidential or local elections are analyzed, similar results arise, especially in terms of turnout. 2 Naturally, this argument is false if armed groups have the capacity of anticipating, some months in advance, how many people will turnout or how they will vote in certain municipalities.
3 In other specifications, not reported here, other controls such as displacement, are utilized. The results are robust to these alternative specifications 4 These interactions are included in order to avoid potential endogeneity between the time-varying versions of these variables and the measures of conflict. For this to be true, it is important to note that I use, when possible, measures of these variables previous to 1994. 5 This argument would explain why the effect of paramilitary violence on voter turnout is not unambiguously positive.
6 The natural log of distance is used in order achieve a better fit, given the dispersion of this variable, although other specifications were used as well (results not reported). See Gelman and Hill (2007) . 7 See some of the results below in order to determine the effects of paramilitary violence on political behavior. 12 Mobilization efforts were unfeasible for those that opposed to the paramilitaries, because violence was a very effective strategy for these illegal armed groups. Many candidates, both for local and national elections, were killed during this period. 13 The coefficient associated with the rate of paramilitary attacks and the 2002 time dummy in column 3 is barely insignificant at a 10% confidence level. However, it becomes significant once we include the time-varying controls (column 4). 14 Results reported in table A.4 allow an easier interpretation of these effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
